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RULE 10b-5: THE REJECTION OF THE BIRNBAUM
DOCTRINE BY EASON v. GENERAL MOTORS
ACCEPTANCE CORP. AND THE NEED FOR
A NEW LIMITATION ON DAMAGES
In Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,1 the Seventh Cir-
cuit became the first circuit to reject the long-standing requirement
that plaintiffs bringing a private action under Securities and Exchange
Commission rule lOb-52 must be either purchasers or sellers of se-
curities as required by the rule announced in the 1952 landmark de-
cision of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.- In 1969, Bank Service Cor-
poration purchased -the automobile leasing business of Dave Waite
Pontiac, Inc. Waite Pontiac had financed -the purchase of the leased
automobiles through General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC), and the consideration given by Bank Service included, in
addition to 7,000 shares of its stock, the assumption of the leasing
business' debts to GMAC; shareholders of Bank Service personally
1. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. Apr. 22,
1974).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
A. BROMBERG, SEcURrrms LAW: FRAUD (1973) [hereinafter cited as A. BROMBERO];
L. Loss, SEcutrrms REGULAI ON (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss];
L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as L. Loss (Supp.
1969)].
2. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1973), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See notes 14-18 infra and accompanying text.
3. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). See notes 25-28
infra and accompanying text.
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guaranteed the leasing business' notes payable to GMAC. Subse-
quently, the leasing business failed, and GMAC brought suit in state
court against the Bank Service shareholders seeking to recover on their
guarantees. Accusing both Waite Pontiac and GMAC of fraud in
connection with the transaction, Bank Service shareholders brought a
federal action based on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 seeking rescis-
sion of the guarantees. Their complaint was dismissed by the trial
court on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing4 since they
were neither purchasers nor sellers of securities. The Seventh Circuit
reversed; framing the issue as the validity of the so-called Birnbaum
doctrine,5 the court stated that neither the Constitution nor any policy
consideration mandated the purchaser-seller requirement. Finding
that such a requirement improperly restricts the coverage of rule
lOb-5, the court unequivocally rejected the Birnbaum doctrine.6
The stock market crash of 1929, and .the depression which fol-
lowed, produced public sentiment in the 1930's for reform of the na-
tion's securities markets.7 In response, President Roosevelt in 1934
recommended to Congress
the enactment of legislation providing for the regulation by the Federal
Government of the operations of exchanges dealing in securities . . .
for the protection of investors, for the safe-guarding of values, and, as
far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise,
and destructive speculation.8
As a result,9 Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 193410
4. In a technical sense, standing refers to a constitutional requirement which must
exist in order for a court to have jurisdiction over a case. A party bringing an action
must show a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute he seeks to have adjudicated.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962). If this is not shown, the action does not meet the "case or controversy" re-
quirement of article Im of the Constitution and the court would not have jurisdiction
to hear the case. The Eason court correctly stated that standing in this constitutional
sense is not involved in the question of whether the purchaser-seller requirement is
valid. However, the word "standing" has been used repeatedly in cases after Birnbaum
to refer to the status of a plaintiff who is within the protection of rule 10b-5. Given
the convenience of the term and its previous usage, "standing" will be used in this sense
throughout this Note.
5. The court stated that "[tihe question which is thus presented is whether,
notwithstanding the fact that they were neither purchasers nor sellers of a security,
plaintiffs may obtain relief under Rule 10b-." 490 F.2d at 656.
6. The court concluded: "We hold that [the purchaser-seller limitation] is not a
part of the law of this circuit." Id. at 661.
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); 1 L. Loss 119-21;
Note, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 83 U. PA. L. Rnv. 255 (1934).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 7, at 2.
9. Congress had previously enacted the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77
(1970), the aim of which was to provide investors with material information related
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(Exchange Act), for the purpose, according to the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, of "purging the securities exchanges of
those practices which have prevented them from fulfilling their pri-
mary function of furnishing open markets for securities where supply
and demand may freely meet at prices uninfluenced by manipulation
or control.""1  To accomplish this purpose, it was necessary for the
Act to be broad in scope.12  As a part of this broad regulation of
the securities exchanges, section 10(b) 8 was included as a catchall
provision designed to prevent manipulative devices and practices.
The Exchange Act, while denominating what subjects are proper
for regulation, left the promulgation of rules and regulations to the
newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).14 Un-
der this authority, the SEC in 1942 promulgated rule 10b-515 to
aid in the implementation of section 10(b). Federal securities law up
to that time had failed to prohibit the fraudulent purchase of securi-
ties by non-brokers.'0  In announcing rule 10b-5, the SEC stated
to securities offered for public sale and to prohibit misrepresentation, fraud and deceit
in sales of securities. R. JENNMNs & H. MARsH, SEcuRrImEs REGULATION 34 (3d ed.
1972),
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1970). For analyses of the Exchange Act written shortly
after the Act became law, see Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025 (1934); Note, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23
GEo. L.J. 93 (1934). See also Note, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note
7.
For a general discussion of the historical background of the Exchange Act and
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, see 1 A. BROmERO § 2.2.
11. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78b
(1970).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 7, at 6.
13. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970). The House committee report stated that the
Exchange Act
leaves to the administrative agencies the determination of the most appropri-
ate form of rule or regulation to be enforced. In a field where practices con-
stantly vary and where practices legitimate for some purposes may be turned
to illegitimate and fraudulent means, broad discretionary powers in the admin-
istrative agency have been found practically essential. H.R. REP. No. 1383,
supra note 7, at 6-7.
15. See note 2 supra.
16. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibited fraud in the offer or
sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Likewise, rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15cl-2 (1973), promulgated under section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, prohib-
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that its purpose was to close "a loophole in the protections against
fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if -they engage in fraud in their pur-
chase." 17  Thus, the original purpose of rule lOb-5, although un-
stated in the rule itself,18 was the protection of sellers of securities
from fraud.
Initially, rule 10b-5 generated little excitement; apparently the
potential it possessed to become an important anti-fraud device was
not immediately recognized. 19  In ,the past twenty years, however,
the growth in the scope of the rule's application has been spectacu-
lar; it has been estimated that presently rule lOb-5 appears in one-
third of all federal securities cases,2" and .the Supreme Court has
commented that "§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well be -the most
litigated provisions in the federal securities laws ... ."I' Thus, section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 have developed into major tools of -the federal
securities law for preventing and punishing fraudulent activities in con-
nection with the purchase and sale of securities.
Of great importance in stimulating the increased application of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 was the recognition of a private right of
action under section 10(b). The Exchange Act itself does not
mention such a right; however, in 1946 the first reported case involv-
ing rule 10b-5 liability, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,22 held
that a person injured as a result of a violation of section 10(b) could
bring a civil suit for damages,2" and this private right of action has
become universally recognized. 24
ited fraud in the purchase or sale of securities by brokers. However, there was no pro-
hibition against the fraudulent purchase of securities by non-brokers. See 3 L. Loss
1426-27; Note, S.E.C. Action Against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 HIv.
L. Ray. 769, 770 (1946).
17. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). This release
can be found in 3 A. BROMBERG 295 (App. B).
18. See 3 L Loss 1469 & n.87. For a general discussion of the original purposes
of rule lOb-5, see 1 A. BROmERG § 2.2(420).
19. See 1 A. BRomBERG § 2.2(420). Section 10(b) likewise aroused little contro-
versy when it was proposed; few comments were made concerning it during congres-
sional consideration of the Exchange Act. Id. § 2.2(330).
20. Id. § 2.5(6). For an indication of the expanding frequency with which rule
lob-5 cases are being brought, see 6 L. Loss 3559 (Supp. 1969).
21. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
22. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
23. For a general discussion of the implied right of action and various rationales
supporting it, see 1 A. BRommERG H 2.4(1)-(2); 3 L. Loss 1557-63.
24. The Supreme Court has recognized this implied private right of action. See
Superintendent of ns v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); cf. 11.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430, 433 (1964) (private right of action under sec-
tion 14 of Exchange Act recognized).
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Since private rights of action under section 10(b) are implied,
there is no express statutory pronouncement as to who has standing
to bring such suits. However, in 1952 Judge Augustus Hand, speak-
ing for the Second Circuit, held in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp."
that only defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities had such stand-
ing. In determining whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring a
section 10(b) action, Judge Hand emphasized the original purpose of
rule 10b-5. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the class of
plaintiffs under rule 10b-5 was not intended to be limited to pur-
chasers or sellers of securities but that rule 10b-5 was meant to sup-
plement the common law liability of persons who breach the fidu-
ciary duties imposed by their corporate positions; it pointed out that
rule 10b-5 was created not for the general protection of shareholders
but to provide federal protection for purchasers and sellers of stock.20
The court held for the defendants, indicating that section 10(b)
was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent prac-
tice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than
at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-
1Ob-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.27
In other words, only purchasers or sellers of securities could bring a
private action under rule 1Ob-5.2 s
The Birnbaum court's analysis of the SEC's purpose in adopting
rule 10b-5 seems sound. Before Eason, all circuit courts that had faced
the issue followed the Birnbaum doctrine,29 and Professor Loss has
25. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). Birnbaum arose out
of the dealings of one Feldmann, the president and forty percent shareholder of New-
port Steel Corporation. Follansbee Steel Corporation had offered to merge with New-
port in a transaction whose terms would have been quite profitable to the shareholders
of Newport. However, Feldmann, acting in his capacity as president, rejected this of-
fer and sold his controlling block of stock to a third company for about twice its then
market value. Plaintiffs, shareholders of Newport who had apparently purchased their
shares well before the sales negotiations and had continued to hold them after Feld-
mann's sale, alleged that representations made in letters sent to Newport stockholders
by Feldmann concerning the Follansbee offer violated rule lob-5 and brought a class
action suit under section 10(b) and rule lob-5. Id. at 462.
26. Id. at 463. See also notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
27. Id. at 464.
28. For discussion of this purchaser-seller requirement, see 1 A. BROMBERi §§ 4.7
(560)-(569); 3 L. Loss 1468-73; 6 L. Loss 3617-20 (Supp. 1969).
29. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
339, 342 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970);
Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971);
City Natl Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
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stated that Birnbaum was "basically correct."" °  Yet from the begin-
ning Birnbaum has aroused a storm of controversy. Commentators
have criticized the decision,31 and the SEC has recommended that
the purchaser-seller requirement be rejected.82  The dissatisfaction
with the Birnbaum doctrine seems to stem not so much from a belief
that Birnbaum incorrectly stated the purpose for adoption of rule
10b-5 as it does from the conviction that thq purchaser-seller re-
quirement is not consonant with the expansive role section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 have come to play in the present scheme of federal securi-
ties regulation. The Birnbaum doctrine precludes the possibility that
federal law33 can be used ,to remedy certain types of fraudulent ac-
tivities.3 4 However, the possibility that victims of securities fraud
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
30. 3 L. Loss 1469.
31. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of The Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for
Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal
Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations--Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus.
LAW. 1289, 1294-95, 1302-03 (1971); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic
Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEo. L.J. 1177 (1968); 1967
Duxn L.J. 898, 901.
32. See, e.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 27-28, Manor Drug Stores v. Blue
Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973). Having concluded that the Birnbaum
doctrine is incorrect because it improperly restricts the scope of rule 10b-5 and is in-
consistent with recent Supreme Court cases, the SEC in its brief stated that
the narrow view of the purpose and coverage of Rule 10b-5 that was articu-
lated in Birnbaum is demonstrably in error in light of the authorities and leg-
islative history . . . . The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Superin-
tendent of Insurance (v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)], in
particular, reflects a broad interpretation of Rule 10b-5 seemingly at odds with
the restrictive view of Birnbaum. . . . Id. at 19.
33. Such a victim still has recourse to state law. Often, one who is kept out of
the federal courts by the Birnbaum doctrine is able to bring a state claim based on
common law fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference
with contractual relations, or tort. Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Preci-
sion Where Standing to Sue Under Rule 10-5 Is Involved, 20 B=ALo L. Rv. 93,
97 (1971). It is interesting to note that the unsuccessful plaintiffs in Birnbaum subse-
quently obtained relief under state law. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). The Second Circuit imposed liability on the
ground that Feldmann's knowledge that the buyers would utilize the entire steel output
of the corporation rather than sell it at the market price was held to have imposed
a duty on Feldmann to share the "premium" he received with the other shareholders.
The fact that fraud victims can rely on state law has not assuaged the Birnbaum
critics, because the real possibility still exists that a securities fraud victim kept out of
federal court by the Birnbaum doctrine will either find no relief in state courts or re-
ceive inadequate relief. Another danger involved in relying too heavily upon state law
in this area was voiced by former Chairman of the SEC, Manual Cohen, who indicated
that the "danger is the ...possibility for lack of uniformity of the standards of cor-
porate responsibility." Cohen, The Development of Rule 10b-5, 23 Bus. LAw. 593, 595
(1968).
34. These classes of cases would be those in which the fraud was not connected
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may be left without an effective remedy has been recognized by the
courts and as a result the Birnbaum doctrine often is not applied
rigidly; rather, judicially created exceptions to the doctrine have de-
veloped which permit certain classes of persons who are neither pur-
chasers nor sellers to bring actions under rule IOb-5. 5
to any transaction by the plaintiff. This would include cases involving the sale of con-
trol by the defendant to third parties, insiders' purchases from third parties, suits by
shareholders brought in their individual capacities involving the sale of securities by
the corporation to third parties, and cases involving only the breach of a fiduciary duty.
See I A. BROMBERG § 4.7(562).
35. The first of these exceptions is that a plaintiff in a private suit seeking only
an injunction does not have to show he was a purchaser or seller of securities. See,
e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434-35 (10th Cir. 1973); Kahan v. Rosenstiel,
424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967). This exception follows from the general rule enunciated
by the Supreme Court that in an action for equitable relief, the plaintiff does not have
to prove all the elements necessary for obtaining relief in an action for money damages.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192-93 (1963). Since a
major rationale for the purchaser-seller requirement is to shield defendants from huge
liability, it is logical to relax the requirement where money damages are not involved.
Further, since by its nature injunctive relief seeks to prevent injury, it would be unrea-
sonable to make such remedies unavailable in rule lob-5 cases until after a sale or pur-
chase has occurred, the point at which the injury normally would occur.
Second, a plaintiff does not have to be a purchaser or seller when bringing a deriv-
ative suit; in this situation, the standing requirement is satisfied if the corporation on
whose behalf the suit is brought bought or sold the securities. See, e.g., Rekant v.
Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1970); Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215,
219 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,
339 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1964). See also 1 A. BROMBERG § 4.7(566). While a literal
application of the Birnbaum doctrine might seem to preclude this result, these derivative
suit cases actually are consistent with Birnbaum, since in a derivative action the plain-
tiff shareholder is not bringing a personal claim but rather is asserting a claim of the
corporation in its behalf. See N. LArrrN, THE LAw oF CoRpoRAToNs §§ 102-04 (2d
ed. 1971). Thus, it is necessarily the corporation and not the plaintiff shareholder who
must meet the requirements of the Birnbaum doctrine.
Third, "forced sellers" may sue under section 10(b) and rule lob-5 despite the ab.
sence of an actual sale of securities. See, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin.
Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Coffee v.
Permian, 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). In these cases,
where fraudulent activity has placed the victim in a position where he has no viable
option except to sell his securities, he is a "forced seller" and courts have determined
that "requiring him to do so [sell his security) seems a needless formality." Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 1967). In Vine, a short-form merger
was executed by defendant corporation. Plaintiff shareholder had held his stock; how-
ever, he was placed in a situation where his only option was either to exchange his
shares pursuant to defendant's offer or to exercise his right of appraisal. The Second
Circuit held that the plaintiff was therefore a forced seller of stock and hence had
standing to sue under section 10(b). Id. at 635.
The concept of "forced sale" was extended in Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). There, the Crane Company's tender offer
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The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the validity of the Birn-
to the shareholders of Westinghouse was fraudulently sabotaged by American Standard,
Inc., which was also seeking control of Air Brake. Standard succeeded in gaining con-
trol of Air Brake and shortly thereafter threatened to bring a divestiture action under
the antitrust laws against Crane, because Crane had become a major shareholder in
Air Brake. The Second Circuit allowed Crane standing to sue Standard under section
10(b) holding that Standards fraud in thwarting Crane's tender offer made Crane a
forced seller under threat of divestiture. Id. at 798. Forced sales have also been rec-
ognized in the context of corporate liquidations. See, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Fac-
tor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1971); Coffee v. Permian Corp.,
434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970). The limits of the "forced seller" exception are difficult
to discern, a difficulty which gives courts wide discretion as to when the forced seller
concept can be invoked to circumvent the purchaser-seller requirement. However, there
are limits as to how far the exception can be stretched. For example, a plaintiff can-
not expect to obtain standing merely by alleging that the defendant's fraud caused the
value of the stock to decline, thus "forcing" plaintiff to sell rather than risk further
loss. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
A fourth exception is granted to the "aborted purchaser-seller," a plaintiff who is
not a purchaser or seller because his agreement to buy or sell has been breached. See,
e.g., A.J. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (plaintiff broker has
standing where defendant ordered securities and then fraudulently refused to purchase);
Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (customer has standing
where broker-dealer fraudulently refused to carry out contract for sale of stock); Com-
merce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (plaintiff has
standing where defendants fraudulently sold stock to third party which they had agreed
to sell to plaintiff); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Iln. 1967)
(plaintiff has standing where defendant broker fraudulently charged for sales which
were never made). But see Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973) (no
standing where plaintiff's efforts to buy 500 shares of stock were frustrated by defend-
ant's fraudulent activity).
Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), is at times cited
as an aborted seller case. In Stockwell, the plaintiffs charged that due to the misrep-
resentation of their broker, they held stock they had originally sought to sell and as
a result lost money. In holding for the plaintiffs, the court emphasized that the plain-
tiffs sold as soon as the fraud was discovered. Id. at 219. However, since the plain-
tiffs had a contractual arrangement with the broker, an aborted seller rationale would
seem to be a more appropriate ground for holding that the purchaser-seller requirement
had been met. Language used in "aborted purchaser-seller" cases sometimes is quite
broad. Passages such as the following are not uncommon in such cases: "lit is un-
necessary to prove a consummated, or closed, purchase or sale as a condition to the
institution of such a suit [under section 10(b)]." Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec,
Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co.,
265 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1967). However, the exception rests on statutory
grounds. Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in pertinent
part:
(13) The terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy, pur-
chase, or otherwise acquire.
(14) The terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract to sell or other-
wise dispose of. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) 13-14 (1970).
Thus, since under the statute a contract is considered a sale or purchase, the purchaser-
seller requirement is met. For an excellent analysis of the aborted purchaser-seller
cases, see Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 345 & n.11, 346 (9th Cir.
1972).
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baum doctrine,"8 and although Supreme Court decisions interpreting
rule 10b-5 have been rare,17 -two recent cases 8 dealing with section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 shed considerable light on the Court's view of
the role that these provisions should play in federal securities regula-
tion. In marked contrast to the limited purposes of rule 10b-5 stated
by Judge Hand in Birnbaum, both cases evidence an expansive read-
ing of these provisions by the Court. Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 9 reflects a liberal attitude toward sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and reveals a willingness to apply those
provisions in situations where the purchaser-seller status of the plain-
tiff is at best subtle.40  The Supreme Court stated that "[slection
10(b) must be read flexibly, not technicaVly ,and restrictively." 41
A year later, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,42 the Su-
36. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), the
Supreme Court noted that the decision did not reach the question of the validity of
the Birnbaum doctrine, since a sale of a security was found. Id. at 12. This was the
first time the Supreme Court mentioned the Birnbaum requirement; one commentator
estimated that prior to the Bankers Life decision, Birnbaum had been cited in 120
lower court cases. 1 A. BROABmER § 4.7(522).
37. The first Supreme Court interpretation of rule 10b-5 did not come until 1969,
in SEC v. National See., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
38. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
39. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Bankers Life involved an alleged conspiracy in which the
sole shareholder of Manhattan Casualty Company sold all his stock to a third party
who immediately sold U.S. Treasury bonds owned by Manhattan and used the proceeds
to purchase the stock, thus financing the purchase of Manhattan with Manhattan's as-
sets. Suit was brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by New York's Superintend-
ent of Insurance, representing Manhattan, who alleged that the transaction was a fraud
upon the company. The Supreme Court held that the action was proper since the cor-
poration itself was a seller of securities (its Treasury bonds) who could allege injury
resulting from fraudulent practices.
40. In the sale of the stock in Bankers Life, both the purchaser and seller were
parties to the fraud and therefore could not complain. Further, since the transaction
involved all the stock of the company, there were no innocent shareholders to bring
a derivative suit. Likewise with respect to the sale of the Treasury bonds, the fraud
did not injure the buyer of the bonds and there were again no innocent shareholders
to bring a derivative suit. Thus, Bankers Life presented the odd situation in which
none of the direct participants in the transaction were injured by the fraud and all the
former and present holders of equity interests in the corporation actually profited from
the fraud. The true injured parties, the creditors of the corporation, clearly did not
have standing under rule 10b-5. The Court circumvented this problem by denominat-
ing the corporation itself as the injured party, despite the fact that all its shareholders
had benefited from the fraud. Id. at 9-13.
41. Id. at 12.
42. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Under the Ute Partition Act, the Ute Indian Tribe dis-
tributed the assets of the tribe to its members by issuing shares of stock. The plain-
tiffs had sold these shares through the defendants, who had acted as market makers
for the stock and had consistently purchased the stock from Indians at well below the
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preme Court, using language similar to that of Bankers Life, again
read section 10(b) broadly,4" providing a further indication -that the
Supreme Court currently views section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 expan-
sively.
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of sectio 10(b) in
Bankers Life contrasts so sharply with the tenor of Birnbaum that
one district court, in Tully v. Mot Supermarkets, Inc.,4- held that
Birnbaum could no longer stand. While Tully involved an action
for injunctive relief, and hence could fall within an exception to the
purchaser-seller requirement, 45 the Tully court instead chose to re-
ject Birnbaum, stating that "[t]o imply . . . a [purchaser-seller] re-
quirement ignores the recent edict by the Supreme Court [in Bankers
Life] mandating a flexible as opposed to a technical or restrictive
construction of [rule l0b-5].' 40  Therefore, the Tully court indi-
cated, "where -there is a causal connection between the purchase or
sale of stock, the alleged fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, and plain-
tiffs loss, then federal jurisdiction under 1 Ob-5 exists. ' '4 7
The Supreme Court's liberal attitude towards section 10(b), plus
the extent of the exceptions to the purchaser-seller requirement of
Birnbaum, have caused uncertainty as to -the current status of -the
purchaser-seller requirement. Several district courts have seemingly
denied the continuing validity of the Birnbaum doctrine,48 and com-
price they obtained on resale. Plaintiffs brought an action under rule lOb-5 but the
Tenth Circuit disallowed recovery since reliance by the plaintiffs on the non-disclosure
causing the harm suffered had not been proved. The Supreme Court reversed, stating
that under these circumstances, proof of the materiality of the non-disclosure was suffi-
cient for recovery. Id. at 153-54.
43. Id. at 151.
44. 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
45. See note 35 supra.
46. 337 F. Supp. at 839. It is arguable, however, that Bankers Life actually re-
flects an unwillingness by the Supreme Court to dispense with the Birnbaum doctrine.
The facts of the case did not present a clear instance of a defrauded seller or purchaser
of securities, since any fraud in the sale of the stock involved both the seller and the
purchaser, and in addition, there were no other shareholders to complain of the later
sale of Treasury bonds. See note 40 supra. However, the Court chose to avoid the
question of the validity of the purchaser-seller requirement by searching for a sale,
rather than first rejecting Birnbaum and thus making the existence of a sale irrelevant.
47. 337 F. Supp. at 842.
48. In Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. Sno. I. REP. 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the court, while noting that the lack
of a purchase or sale normally precludes an action for damages, allowed standing be-
cause the clear reliance of the plaintiff made causation and damages easily provable.
The case would appear clearly to reject Birnbaum (since the claim was based on a non-
acceptance of a tender offer and there was no sale), except for the fact that the court
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mentators have gone so far as to announce, albeit prematurely, the
demise of the purchaser-seller requirement.49 Yet, while the strict
requirement stated by Birnbaum has been eroded, until Eason all the
circuits continued to adhere generally to the doctrine, at least in ac-
tions for damages.50 While courts have seemed adept at avoiding
the purchaser-seller requirement where particularly unfair results
would be caused by its application, 5' there has been a marked un-
stated in the midst of the opinion that "plaintiffs can . . . be regarded as actual sellers
of securities." Id. at 98,705. In Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234 (D.
Neb. 1972), the district court, acting on a motion for summary judgment, stated that
the plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers and yet allowed standing. The court
ruled that a sale or purchase was not necessary as long as section 10(b) was violated
and the plaintiff's stock decreased in value as a result. Id. at 238. In the decision
on the merits, Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972), how-
ever, the district court stated there was a sale and purchase since there was a merger.
Id. at 243. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit stated in a footnote that standing was
proper, but cited a forced seller case. 473 F.2d 537, 541 n.6 (8th Cir. 1973). In En-
tel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court stated that the forced seller
and aborted seller-purchaser cases came close to overruling Birnbaum, if they did not
in fact do so. Id. at 69.
49. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 31. It is perhaps well to remember the cau-
tionary words of Professor Loss that the pronouncements of the death of Birnbaum
"evoke memories of Mark Twain." 6 L. Loss 3620 (Supp. 1969).
50. See note 29 supra. Recently the Third Circuit, while noting that the Birnbaum
doctrine has undergone some erosion, stated that "[bluyer or seller status is indispen-
sable in establishing liability for damages under rule lOb-5." Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974). Since
Eason was decided, the Fifth Circuit has stated: "To eliminate any doubt, we expressly
reaffirm the vitality of the purchaser-seller requirement in this circuit." Sargent v. Ge-
nesco, Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 2552, 2553 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 1974).
51. Courts may circumvent the purchaser-seller requirement by employing one of
its several exceptions. See note 35 supra. If none is available, courts may still allow
standing by broadly defining sale and purchase. For example, in International Con-
trols Corp. v. Vesco, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,356 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1974), the
plaintiff corporation asserted that certain of defendant's actions violated rule lob-5.
To meet the purchaser-seller requirement, plaintiff argued that a dividend it had paid
to its shareholders consisting of portfolio securities was a sale of securities. This asser-
tion ran counter, however, to Show v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
337 U.S. 907 (1949), which had held that purchase and sale for the purposes of the
Exchange Act meant acquisition or disposition for consideration. Id. at 142. Al-
though clearly no consideration was given for the dividend of portfolio securities the
International Controls court held that the dividend constituted a sale for purposes of
Birnbaum. The court stated that "although in other contexts the term 'sale' might ap-
propriately be construed more narrowly, we find a rote emphasis on consideration in-
consistent with the broad scope of protection under 10(b) .. . ." CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 94,356, at 95,196. See also Cambridge Capital Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l
Bank, 350 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1972), where it was held that a plaintiff who had
a security interest in securities sold at a sheriff's sale was a "seller of securities."
Even when no exceptions are available and the case does not lend itself to appli-
cation of a broad definition of purchase and sale, a court may still allow suit to be
brought. In Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973),
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willingness to abrogate the requirement generally. Thus, the Birn-
baum doctrine has remained a major stumbling block on the road to
rule 10b-5 recovery. 52
Against this background, the Seventh Circuit faced the issues pre-
sented by Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.53 and unequivo-
cally declared that the Birnbaum doctrine "is not part of the law of
this circuit."'54 Judge Stevens began by rejecting the plaintiffs' sug-
gestion that they were "sellers" (or "purchasers") of a security.5
Rather, he indicated -that the issue presented was the continuing validity
of the Birnbaum doctrine:
The question which is thus presented is whether, notwithstanding
the fact that they were neither purchasers nor sellers of a security,
plaintiffs may obtain relief under Rule l0b-5.5 6
Assuming that all other jurisdictional requirements had been ade-
quately alleged,57 the court analyzed the Birnbaum doctrine itself.
Initially, the court criticized the frequent references to the purchaser-
seller limitation as a "standing requirement," indicating that the ques-
tion before the court was not one of constitutional standing, 8 but
rather was whether the plaintiffs were members of the class which
rule 10b-5 was designed to protect. The court noted that rule 10b-5
plaintiffs had been entitled under an antitrust consent decree to purchase a fixed
amount of defendant corporation's stock at a discount. Due to defendant's alleged
fraud, plaintiffs were discouraged from purchasing, and sued under rule 10b-5. The
Ninth Circuit allowed standing, stating that the consent decree was the "functional
equivalent" of a contract which made causation and damages capable of proof, which
in turn satisfied the demands of the Birnbaum doctrine. For authority, the court cited
aborted purchaser-seller cases. Those cases, however, are not based on the degree of
speculativeness of damages but on the statutory definition of sale and purchase. See
note 35 supra. Since in Manor Drug there clearly was no sale, broad definitions could
not be used to circumvent the purchaser-seller requirement. Still, the court allowed
standing.
52. As Judge Wisdom has commented: "Bloody but unbowed, Birnbaum still
stands." Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. Apr. 22,
1974). See notes 1-6 supra and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 661.
55. Plaintiffs had argued that the guarantees themselves were securities sold to
GMAC, that the underlying notes were securities they had been forced to purchase,
and that they were indirect sellers of the 7,000 shares of stock. Id. at 656.
56. Id.
57. It is interesting to note that the court stated that Bank Service clearly could
have brought suit. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs could have avoided the purchaser-
seller issue by bringing a derivative action. See note 35 supra. Choosing to bring suit
on the guarantees they had given in their personal capacities, however, foreclosed this
result.
58. A party bringing an action must always show a personal stake in the contro-
versy he seeks to have adjudicated. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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had 'been extended to cover many types of misconduct and had been
interpreted to extend protection to persons not within the purview of
the traditional definition of purchaser or seller; and additionally, the
Supreme Court had commanded that rule lOb-5 should be read flexibly
and broadly. 9 While acknowledging that no Supreme Court decision
could 'be Tead as rejecting the Birnbaum doctrine, the court stated that
recent Supreme Court rulings implied -that the purchaser-seller require-
ment -too narrowly restricted the proper scope of rule 10b-5. c0  The
Eason court then held that the rule properly extends coverage to all
persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer significant injury as
a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction,
even though their participation in the transaction did not involve either
the purchase or the sale of a security."'
Responding to the contention that rejection of Birnbaum would re-
sult in a flood of federal litigation and inconsistency in the interpreta-
tion of federal securities law, the court indicated that these results
were outweighed by the importance of giving proper effect to rule
lOb-5. 2 However, the court refused to attempt to formulate a new
standard, trusting instead "that the appropriate limits to the rule will
best be defined through the process of case by case adjudication." '
The essence of -the controversy surrounding the Birnbaum doc-
trine is the question of who may invoke the protection of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. ]n 1952, the Second Circuit in Birnbaum de-
clared that only purchasers and sellers should be so protected. The
fact that over twenty years elapsed and hundreds of cases were de-
cided before even one circuit court unequivocally rejected this formu-
lation of the scope of rule 1Ob-5 seems to reflect a belief that some
limitation upon the class of persons protected by rule IOb-5 is nec-
essary. 4 On the other hand, the number of exceptions which have arisen
and the somewhat flexible manner in which the rule has been applied
seem to manifest a countervailing belief that the purchaser-seller re-
quirement is not a completely acceptable delineation of the proper
scope of section, 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Whatever the wisdom of
59. 490 F.2d at 658-59. See notes 38-43 supra and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 659.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 660-61.
63. Id. at 660.
64. The importance of the Birnbaum doctrine as a limitation on the number of po-
tential plaintiffs and the magnitude of lOb-5 damages liability has often been recog-
nized and commented upon. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir.
1970); Lowenfels, supra note 31, at 269-71; Ruder, supra note 31, at 1294-95; Com-
ment, supra note 31, at 1178-79.
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the substance of the Eason court's holding, one must commend its
decision, when faced with a plaintiff who seemed deserving of rule
lOb-5 protection yet who was neither a purchaser nor seller, to ana-
lyze the validity of the Birnbaum doctrine 5 rather than to follow
the now common practice of avoiding the effects of the purchaser-
seller requirement either by utilizing an exception thereto or by de-
fining purchaser or seller broadly.
When one does examine the substance of the Eason court's
decision, its conclusion that the purchaser-seller requirement is a faulty
and improper delineation of the scope of coverage of rule lOb-5 is
difficult to criticize. The limitation imposed by Birnbaum was deter-
mined with reference to the purpose which rule lOb-5 was meant to
have when promulgated by the SEC in 1942.6 Since Birnbaum was
decided, however, the application of rule lOb-5 has expanded spec-
tacularly."7  Thus the present question should be not so much
whether the purchaser-seller requirement is consonant with the orig-
inal purpose of rule lOb-5, but whether it is compatible with the ex-
ceedingly widespread role that rule lOb-5 has come to play in mod-
em federal securities -regulation. The Birnbaum requirement seems
at odds not only with rule lOb-5's current usage but also with the
Supreme Court's liberal reading of the rule. 8 Further, the pur-
chaser-seller requirement has been largely robbed of its internal logic
by the exceptions which have developed to the doctrine and by
the use of broad definitions of "purchas&' and "sale."69  When the
fact that the requirement is at times seemingly applied in an arbitrary
fashion70 is added to these criticisms, it becomes difficult to criticize
65. The court's conclusion that the issue involved is the coverage of the rule rather
than constitutional standing is sound. In these cases, the plaintiffs clearly have a direct
injury as required for constitutional standing. See note 4 supra. Further, Birnbaum
itself was based upon a conclusion as to the proper scope of rule 10b-5, rather than
the issue of constitutional standing. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
69. The Seventh Circuit in Eason noted that the purchaser-seller requirement does
not "have integrity when the words 'purchaser' and 'seller' are construed as flexibly as
has been necessary in order both to decide 10b-5 cases properly and also to continue
to pay homage to the Birnbaum rule." 490 F.2d at 659.
70. A court may circumvent the purchaser-seller requirement in one case yet apply
it in another quite similar case. Compare Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464
F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972), with Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136
(9th Cir. 1973). The plaintiff in each of these cases was fraudulently prevented from
buying securities at a legally required sale. In Mount Clemens the plaintiff was
thwarted from purchasing securities at a sheriff's sale, 464 F.2d at 340; in Manor Drug,
the plaintiff was fraudulently dissuaded from purchasing securities required to be of-
Vol 1974:6101
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1974:610
a court which takes the forthright step of rejecting the Birnbaum doc-
trine.
The Eason court's decision may be faulted, however, for failing
to consider the formulation of a substitute limiting standard. The
court indicated two policy justifications for continued adherence to
the purchaser-seller requirement: limiting the federal judiciary's
workload and promoting consistency in the interpretation of federal
securities laws. However, there is at least one additional justification
for the requirement that should have been recognized and consid-
ered: the purchaser-seller requirement is a limiting doctrine, which,
by restricting the number of plaintiffs who can successfully bring suits
under rule 10b-5, serves to limit the total potential liability of any in.
dividual or corporation.7 1
The problem of "draconian damage claims" 72 under rule 10b-5
has become one of increasing concern. 73 Recent cases have im-
posed on defendant corporations liability far exceeding their net
worth.74 While the various elements necessary for rule 10b-5 recov-
fered to him under an antitrust consent decree. 492 F.2d at 138-40. In Mount Clem-
ens, standing was not allowed, 464 F.2d at 341-47, while in Manor Drug the case was
permitted to go to trial, 492 F.2d at 140-42. Compare Neuman v. Electronic Specialty
Co., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. % 92,591 (N.D. I11.
1969), with Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). Both cases involved tender offers. In Neu-
man, plaintiffs did not accept a tender offer due to defendant's alleged fraud, 92,951
at 98,702; in Iroquois, plaintiffs tender offer was thwarted by defendant's alleged fraud,
417 F.2d at 966. Therefore, neither case involved the purchase or sale of a security.
However, standing was allowed in Iroquois and not in Neuman. See also Ruder, supra
note 31, at 1294-95 & n.35.
71. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
72. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 (9th Cir. 1973)
(dissenting opinion).
73. See, e.g., Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 BUF-
FALo L. Rnv. 205 (1970); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity
and State of Mind in Rule lob-5 Purchase and Sales Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423
(1968); Note, The Role of Scienter and the Need to Limit Damages in Rule l0b-5
Actions-The Texas Gulf Sulphur Litigation, 59 Ky. L.J. 891 (1971).
74. Note, for example, the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. The facts of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur (TGS) cases are as follows: TGS made an incredibly rich strike of ore
in Canada, which had become apparent by November 12, 1963, when the first test
drilling was completed. For a period of five months the results of this and other tests
were withheld from the public, but, during this same period insiders, aware of the dis-
covery, purchased TGS stock and calls. On April 12, 1964, TGS issued a somewhat
pessimistic press release intended to quash rumors about the strike. It was not until
April 16, 1964, that TGS made an official public announcement revealing the true na-
ture of the discovery. These events resulted in suits brought under rule lOb-5, based al-
ternatively on either non-disclosure of material facts from November 12th to April 16th
or on plaintiffs' reliance on the misleading press release. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843-47 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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ery remain uncertain, 75 it seems clear that during the last ten years,
the requirements have become less stringent. As a result the possi-
bility of crushing liability under rule lOb-5 has become increasingly
real. Rejection of -the purchaser-seller requirement, by allowing a
greater number of plaintiffs to succeed in rule lOb-5 suits, or at least
to overcome preliminary motions to dismiss,7 6 merely exacerbates
The amount of TGS's potential liability resulting from these cases was tremendous.
Professor Ruder estimates that-if recission were used as the measure of damages (in-
cluding loss of future profits which would have been made) and relief given from No-
vember 12th to April 16th, damages would have amounted to over $390,000,000; this
sum would have been $150,000,000 more than TGS's net worth. Ruder, supra note
73, at 428-29. Another writer calculates that if the Utah District Court's formula of
damages in Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970),
affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (based on the value the stock
reached during a reasonable period after the full announcement), were to be multiplied
by the number of shares traded during the eleven trading days following the April 12th
press release, damages for that period alone would equal $30,978,554-or about 23%
of total shareholder equity. Note, supra note 73, at 909-10. Eighty-one New York
cases were settled for $2,700,000; TGS has deposited this amount in escrow in two
funds. In the first, $2,200,000 was set aside for claims based on reliance upon the
press release; $500,000 was placed in the second fund for claims based on non-disclos-
ure during testing. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308, 310-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
75. It has become quite difficult to discern the status of each of the various ele-
ments needed for rule lob-5 recovery. For example, it was once rather uniformly
thought that reliance by plaintiffs on the alleged fraud was a prerequisite to recovery
in rule lOb-5 cases. However, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972), the Supreme Court held that, in that particular case, proof of reliance was
not necessary for recovery. Id. at 152-54. At least one court has interpreted Ute as
holding that when materiality is shown, proof of reliance is not needed. In re Penn
Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1344 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified in part, 357
F. Supp. 860 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Likewise, scienter on the part of the defendants was
at one time considered a necessary rule lOb-5 element. Today there is considerable
controversy over whether a showing of mere negligence is sufficient. Compare Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Proof of 'scienter' . . . is not re-
quired under Section 10(b)"), with Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammil & Co., 448 F.2d 442,
445 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It is insufficient to allege mere negligence"), and White v.
Abrams, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,457 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1974). Professor Loss
has indicated a reason for the uncertainty as to what elements are required in a private
cause of action under lOb-5:
Since Congress could have given no thought to civil liability under 10(b), ob-
viously it could provide no comprehensive scheme with respect to the basic
elements of a private right of action under the then inconceived Rule lOb-5
-the extent of an affirmative obligation to speak, materiality, reliance,
scienter, causation, privity, or measure of damages. Loss, Reporter's Introduc-
tory Memorandum, in ALI FEDERAL SEcURTIs CODE xvii (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1973).
The trend in general has been from strict to more lax standards. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the various elements necessary for rule lob-5 recovery, see Note, SEC Rule
10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 860 (1972).




The potential for increased liability resulting from a rejection of
the purchaser-seller requirement does not mean, however, that the
Seventh Circuit erred in rejecting the Birnbaum doctrine. This consid-
eration does not affect the validity of the reasons discussed above
which demonstrate -that Birnbaum is out of harmony with rule 10b-5's
present role in federal securities regulation.78 Further, even if some
limitation is needed to confine the potentially vast liability of defend-
ants in rule 10b-5 cases, the purchaser-seller requirement has proved
to be an inefficient limiting device in that it may allow draconian dam-
age claims in some cases79 while -totally prohibiting recovery in other
cases where there exists a definite ceiling on the defendant's potential
liability.8 ° Thus it would seem that the most satisfactory approach to
the problem would be to abrogate Birnbaum and erect in its place
a new and more effective limitation on damages.
While equity would seem to demand that all those injured by
fraud in a securities transaction, including non-purchaser-sellers, be
afforded some form of relief, several deleterious effects would result
from a rejection of the Birnbaum doctrine unaccompanied by a new
limiting standard. The elimination of the purchaser-seller require-
ment will import into the arena of rule lOb-5 a new class of plain-
tiffs with respect to whom it will be more difficult than ever for the
courts to arrive at an assessment of the damages actually incurred.
The reason for this is that in those cases where the plaintiff himself
neither purchased nor sold the security in question, whether he suf-
fered any harm as a result of the defendant's fraudulent conduct and,
cases to settle the case once the complaint survives preliminary motions to dismiss. See
6 L. Loss 3579 (Supp. 1969).
77. Note the increase in potential liability that a rejection of the purchaser-seller
requirement would have in a situation like that of Texas Gulf Sulphur. The corpora-
tion would be liable not only to shareholders who had sold the stock during the period
between publication of the fraudulent press release and announcement of the true na-
ture of affairs, but it would also conceivably be liable to all people who would have
bought the stock during that period if all the facts had been revealed as soon as they
were known. Admittedly, such persons would find it more difficult to prove their case
than would the selling shareholders; still, it is unlikely that this would present an insur-
mountable obstacle to recovery in every case. Further, if such persons were able to
survive a preliminary motion to dismiss, settlement would become likely. See note 76
supra.
78. See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text.
79. For example, the Birnbaum doctrine did not prevent huge liabilities in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. See note 74 supra.
80. Eason is an excellent illustration: it was a case with fixed and limited liabil-
ity-the $300,000 loss to be borne either by the plaintiffs or GMAC. Still, a strict
application of the Birnbaum doctrine would not have allowed such a case to go to trial.
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if so, the magnitude of that harm will be exceedingly difficult to
demonstrate."' This difficulty might in turn greatly complicate any
class action to which such plaintiffs are parties,82 a matter of particu-
lar interest given the importance that class actions have had in rule
10b-5 cases."3  Furthermore, class action participation ,by such plain-
tiffs could result in a lessening of the standard of proof necessary for
recovery; indeed, it has been noted that the effect of class actions on
rule lOb-5 cases has been "to restrict the operation of any element
that would frustrate commonality and fragment or prevent recovery
by the class."8' 4 In any event, difficulties of proof would not thwart
all non-purchaser-seller plaintiffs,"8 and the likelihood of huge dam-
age claims would thus be increased. Further, even if many such
plaintiffs would be unable ultimately to succeed on the merits, many
81. The Ninth Circuit has recently observed that the primary justification for im-
position of the purchaser-seller requirement is the problem of proof in cases brought
by non-purchaser-sellers: "Ordinarily there will be little proof (other than the non-pur-
chaser's own opinion, after the loss) that the non-purchaser would in fact have pur-
chased but for the fraud, and, if so, how much, when, or at what price. . . ." Manor
Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Boone
& McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule Ob-5, 49 Tax. L. REv. 617, 647-48
(1971); Kellogg, supra note 33, at 96-97.
82. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require as a prerequisite for any class
action that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predom-
inate." Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3). See also Note, Class Action Treatment of Securi-
ties Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 1150, 1153-54
(1968). Defendants would more than likely argue that with regard to the non-pur-
chaser-seller plaintiffs as to whom such questions of causation and damages existed,
commonality did not exist. If this argument were accepted, destruction of the class
might result.
83. One court has written:
If, as here, the security in connection with which the alleged misrepresenta-
tions and violations of 10b-5 have been made is publicly held, a class action
may well be the appropriate means for expeditious litigation of the issues, be-
cause a large number of individuals may have been injured, although no one
person may have been damaged to a degree which would have induced him
to institute litigation solely on his own behalf. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
For further discussions of the benefits derived from the use of the class action in se-
curities litigation, see Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 100-01 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1966); 3 L. Loss 1819-24; Comment, The Impact
of Class Actions on Rule lOb-5, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 337, 365-71 (1971).
84. Comment, supra note 83, at 345. For a case-by-case analysis of the effect
class actions have had upon rule 10b-5, see id. at 341-65. See also Note, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device and Its Utilization, 22 U. FLA.
L. REV, 631, 643-45 (1970).
85. Given the willingness shown by the courts during the last decade to lessen the
stringency of the various elements necessary for rule 10b-5 relief, see note 75 supra
and accompanying text, the problem of proof of causation and damages could conceiv-
ably prove to be less difficult than one would at first assume.
Vol. 1974:6101
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1974:610
could survive a preliminary motion to dismiss and would therefore be
able to participate in settlements in lOb-5 cases, which as noted
above are frequent. 81
The formulation of a new limitation on liability would also be
important for several additional reasons. First, there is little logic
in submitting a corporation to liability in excess of its net worth or an
individual to liability in excess of an amount he conceivably can pay
-both of which could frequently occur in the absence of a limiting
doctrine. It is difficult to find in the securities laws a policy which
justifies placing corporations and their insiders under the threat of
bankruptcy. Deterrence of fraudulent activity would seem to require
less than the huge potential liability present in many cases today. Nor
can it be argued that the benefits of full compensation -to victims
justify such a result; manifestly, once liability exceeds the amount
which a defendant can pay, full recovery becomes illusory. It may be
argued that the defendant caused the harm and therefore the plaintiff
ought to be fully compensated regardless of the resultant harm to the
defendant, as is the theory in tort or contract.8 7 However, it is argu-
able that recovery under rule 1Ob-5 is reaching a point exceeding mere
compensation; that is, cases have been decided in which the plaintiff's
recovery seems even to have exceeded the damages suffered.88 As
86. See note 76 supra.
87. See 5 A. CoRBIN, CoBnIN ON CoNTRACMs § 992 (1964); W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE AwOF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971).
88. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc., v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795 (W.D. Pa.), vacated
and remanded, CCII FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,339 (3d Cir. 1973). In Rochez, the
plaintiff corporation and the defendant were both 50 percent shareholders of M.S. &
R., Inc., defendant was president and plaintiff's president was vice president. Because
of dissension between them, they found it difficult to run the business. Finally, a buy-
sell agreement between them was agreed upon; plaintiff agreed to sell its shares to de-
fendant for $598,000, and the sale took place in November, 1967. The defendant did
not inform the plaintiff that two parties had previously expressed interest in purchasing
the business; at any rate, both of these parties determined not to purchase. Subse-
quently, in July 1968, defendant did sell out to Esterline Corporation, which had ex-
pressed no interest in the business until five months after plaintiff had sold his interest.
Defendant received as consideration $4,250,000 in cash plus 50,000 shares of Esterline
restricted stock. Id. at 799-801. Even though the plaintiff as vice president was in
a position of knowing completely about the inside workings of the company, and his
financial expertise was superior to that of the defendant, he alleged that defendant's
failure to disclose that other parties had expressed some interest in purchasing the busi-
ness constituted a violation of rule lob-5. The trial court admitted that "[w]hen plain-
tiff sold its half, it was not worth much if anything more than what plaintiff received
for it." Id. at 804. Further, the court recognized that the increase in price paid by
Esterline was largely the result of the managerial efforts of the defendant after the
plaintiff sold out. Id. at 803. Nevertheless the court held the defendant liable under
rule lob-5 for non-disclosure of the interest shown by the two potential buyers; dam-
ages were calculated at $402,000. Id. at 805-06. On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed
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the reach of rule 10b-5 becomes wider, it becomes efficacious to
consider the effect such recovery has upon the defendant. It is im-
portant to note that the ultimate burden of liability under rule 10b-5
often rests on the defendant corporation's shareholders, who paradox-
ically are "usually the most important segment of the total category
of investors intended to be protected." 9  For example, if the cor-
poration is stung with a large judgment, it is the shareholders who are
hurt." If a judgment is obtained against an officer or director,
the possibility exists that the corporation will indemnify 1im,91 thus
that the defendant had violated rule 10b-5; however, it found the damage award to be
erroneous. Despite the trial court's finding that most of the increase in price of the
stock resulted from the personal efforts of the defendant, the court of appeals deter-
mined that the damages were 50 percent of the consideration given by Esterline, minus
the purchase price received by plaintiff. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,339, at 95,151.
This figure was approximately $2,000,000. If this is compensation, then it is compen-
sation with a vengeance.
Negligent non-disclosure by a corporation of a material fact concerning the corpo-
ration in the absence of any trading by the corporation or its insiders presents another
situation in which the recovery at times appears to exceed the amount of harm resulting
to the plaintiff. See note 90 infra. If the non-disclosure lasts for any length of time
and there is active trading in the corporation's stock, the total liability will add up to
a tremendous figure. Yet the plaintiffs were not injured by the presence in the market
of traders with superior knowledge. In such a case, parity of information was present
among all traders; the problem lay in the fact that everyone trading had insufficient
information. When the loss experienced by the plaintiff is caused in this manner, it
is harder to justify the huge damage claims against the corporation than when the cor-
poration or its insiders have been in the market reaping profits on the basis of inside
information. In such situations, full recovery of all losses of all plaintiffs would seem
to place upon the corporation a greater onus than its action or inaction merits.
In considering whether rule lob-5 has gone beyond compensation, not only the
damage awards but also the settlement rate should be considered. There is a marked
tendency for defendants to settle lob-5 cases if the plaintiffs survive preliminary mo-
tions to dismiss. See note 76 supra. This settlement rate is caused no doubt by the
potential for huge damage awards and the general uncertainty as to the elements neces-
sary for recovery. As the requirements for rule lob-5 recovery become less stringent,
see note 75 supra and accompanying text, it becomes easier for plaintiffs to survive
such motions, and therefore, it may be expected that rule lOb-5 settlements increasingly
will include not only plaintiffs who clearly have been injured by defendant's fraud, but
also plaintiffs whose injury is doubtful at best.
89. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1370 (1966).
Judge Moore, dissenting in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), while criticizing the imposition of liability
resulting from a corporate press release, commented:
And finally there is the sardonic anomaly that the very members of society
which Congress has charged the SEC with protecting, i.e., the stockholders,
will be the real victims of its misdirected zeal. Id. at 889.
90. It has also been suggested that a part of a defendant corporation's damage pay-
ments may in some instances be passed on to the customers of the corporation. See
Comment, Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for Negligently Misleading Corporate Releases:
A Proposal for the Apportionment of Losses, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 162, 168 (1973).
91. Indemnification of officers and directors is provided for in two states which
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draining funds from the corporation and injuring its shareholders.
Even if no action is ever brought against the corporation or its of-
ficers or directors, the risk of huge damage claims may impel the cor-
poration's purchase of insurance for its officers and directors.02 Once
again, the cost is ultimately borne by the corporation's sharehold-
ers. Even when indemnification by the corporation or insurance
purchased by the corporation is not employed, the shareholders may
nonetheless be injured if the threat of huge liability causes competent
outsiders to refuse to accept directorships. 3 It may be argued, how-
ever, that such costs ought to be borne by shareholders who are own-
ers and ultimate controllers of the corporation. While this argu-
ment may have validity in the case of a closely-held corporation where
corporate action is directed or at least closely monitored by the share-
holders, it has little force in the case of a large public-issue corpora-
tion whose shareholders are almost all passive investors who take no
real part in the management of the corporation. Especially in those
areas just beginning to be reached by rule 10b-5, the equities between
plaintiffs and passive shareholders become difficult to balance. 4 In
have a large amount of corporate litigation, New York and Delaware. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Cum. Supp. 1970); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 722-26 (McKinney
1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973-74). For an extensive discussion of indem-
nification of corporate officers and directors, and a compilation of state statutes dealing
with indemnification, see G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE
Exncun v (1963).
92. California and New York have recently enacted provisions providing for insur-
ance to indemnify corporate officers and directors. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §
830(h) (West Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727 (McKinney Supp. 1973-74).
See generally Bishop, New Cure for an Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and
Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAw. 92 (1966); Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liabil-
ity Insurance, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 716 (1967); Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate
Executives, 80 HARv. L. Rnv. 648 (1967).
93. It may be asserted that the widespread threat of rule 10b-5 liability might com-
pel corporations to select their directors more carefully, hence benefiting the sharehold-
ers. This argument breaks down, however, if the size of potential liabilities is so great
as to make directorships worthwhile only to those who are significantly benefited by
holding them (e.g., insiders).
For discussions of the potential liability of corporate officers and directors, see G.
WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 91, at 1-5; Anderson, Directors and Officers Lia-
bility Insurance, 47 CH. B. REC. 31 (1965); Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate
Executives, supra note 92.
94. Take the situation, for example, where a corporation negligently fails to dis-
close the existence of a new product which will substantially increase the value of the
corporation's stock; however, during the period of non-disclosure, neither the corpora-
tion nor its insiders purchase or sell any stock. Professor Loss states that such cases
should not result in recovery. See 6 L. Loss 3597 (Supp. 1969). However, Professor
Marsh states that such a decision would be within the current scope of rule lob-5 as
interpreted by various cases. Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule lOb-5?, 24 Bus.
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light of the exacerbating effect which abolition of the purchaser-seller
requirement will have on these problems, it may be concluded that it
would have been wise for the Seventh Circuit at least to have consid-
ered the need for a substitute limiting standard.
Such -a limitation could follow Birnbaum and limit damages indi-
rectly; that is, it could decrease potential liability by limiting the class
of plaintiffs. However, such limitation, because it would only indi-
rectly limit damages, would seem to possess the same flaw as Birn-
baum-being at times either over-restrictive (that is, frustrating ac-
tions with limited total claims which would otherwise be successful)
or under-restrictive (,that is, allowing actions with enormous damage
claims to succeed). 95  It would seem instead that the limitation
should impose an arbitrary maximum liability for each defendant for
every violation of rule lOb-5.9 6 Such a limiting standard could em-
ploy several degrees of severity, based on the nature of the violation. 97
LAw. 69, 69-70 (1968). Assuming that the jurisdictional requirements were met, it
must be questioned whether the benefits of rule lOb-5 recovery to sellers of the stock
outweigh the harm done the corporation and its shareholders. It must be noted that
the sellers were not injured in the normal sense; that is, they were not harmed because
segments of the market possessed non-public information. Rather, the sellers did not
make as much money as they would have because everyone in the market did not have
full information.
95. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
96. This suggestion is not a novel one for federal securities law. The ALI Federal
Securities Code, of which Professor Loss is the reporter, would impose such an arbi-
trary limitation on total damages for a negligent misstatement or omission in a required
filing. Damages against each defendant would be limited to the greatest of (A)
$100,000, (B) one percent (to a maximum of $1,000,000) of defendant's gross income
in the defendant's last fiscal year, or (C) defendant's profit. ALI FEDERAL SEcuarmrus
CODE § 1403(g) (2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). No such arbitrary limitation is pro-
vided for knowing misrepresentations in a filing or for illegal or deceptive sales or pur-
chases, although damages in the latter categories are limited to the extent of the securi-
ties sold or bought by the defendant. Id. at §§ 1401(d)(2) & 1402(f)(2)(B).
97. Analogies can be found in other areas of the law in which the degree of culpa-
bility affects the size of the damages awarded. In tort, for instance, if the defendant's
conduct is particularly outrageous, punitive damages may be awarded; in such a situa-
tion, the plaintiff's recovery goes beyond compensation, which is the usual standard for
tort recovery. See W. PRossmn, supra note 87, at 9-14. Automobile guest statutes, en-
acted in over half the states, allow tort recovery from the driver of an automobile by
a gratuitous guest only where the driver is guilty of gross negligence. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1959); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1964); TEX. Rv. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6701(b) (1969). See also W. PROSSm, supra, at 186-87. For
the handling of similar situations in regard to airplane accidents, see Whitehead, Legal
Liability of Owners and Operators of Aircraft in General Aviation for Damages to
Third Parties, 15 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1963). A number of state statutes, dealing
with such subjects as bailments, voluntary agencies, acts by public officials, involuntary
depositories, and so on, predicate recovery on various degrees of fault. For an old but
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For purely negligent violations9" by a corporation, total damages re-
coverable could be restricted to the greater of the profit made by the
defendant due -to his fraud or a predetermined percentage 9 of the de-
fendant corporation's earnings.'0 If such an approach were uti-
lized, the defendant at a minimum would be forced to yield any profits
derived from the violation; if, however, its ability to pay (as meas-
ured by the predetermined percentage of its earnings) exceeded the
benefit realized, this larger figure would set the limit on damages.
For a violation involving gross negligence or wilful misconduct, 01
,the ceiling on liability should be set higher, not merely because such
behavior is more reprehensible than mere negligence, but also be-
cause in such cases the possible penalty should outweigh the possible
profits from the fraud in order to deter corporations and their insiders
from coldly gambling that their fraud will go undetected. Thus, max-
imum liability for gross negligence or wilful misconduct could be
limited to a fixed multiple of a defendant corporation's profit from
the transaction or a stepped-up percentage of defendant corporation's
earnings, whichever was greater. Similar limitations could be estab-
lished for violations by insiders.' 0
extremely comprehensive review of such statutes, see Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6
S. CAL. L. R V. 91, 127-35 (1933).
98. For a detailed analysis of limitation on 10b-5 damages for negligently mislead-
ing corporate public statements and press releases, see Comment, supra note 90. The
Comment suggests two possible methods of limiting liability: one approach would be
to limit the total damages recoverable to a percentage of corporate earnings or fix the
amount of damages, while allowing them to be paid out of earnings over time. Id.
at 172-73. The second approach would be to apportion the loss incurred among the
plaintiffs and the stockholders according to their relative equity holdings. Id. at 173-78.
99. This percentage should be high enough to deter the activity yet not be so high
as to cripple the corporation.
100. A percentage of earnings approach is utilized because it seems to represent in
at least a rough fashion the defendant corporation's ability to pay. A percentage of
earnings approach has likewise been employed in a proposed arbitrary limitation on
damages for negligent misstatements or admissions in a required finding, ALI FEDumAL
SEcurrms CODE, supra note 96, § 1403(g)(2), and a proposed limitation on negli-
gent public releases by corporations, Comment, supra note 90, at 172.
101. It may be questioned whether a limitation on damages for gross negligence or
wilful misconduct is appropriate. However, the argument against the wisdom of allow-
ing huge damage liabilities to fall upon defendants, see notes 87-94 supra and accom-
panying text, would seem to apply regardless of the degree of culpability of the defend-
ants. Therefore, if a limitation for negligent violations of rule lob-5 is found to be
appropriate, it would seem to follow that some limitation is likewise needed in cases
involving higher levels of culpability. Of course, it is important that the limitation be
set sufficiently high to deter such activity.
102. To be an effective deterrent, the percentage of earnings would probably have
to be higher in regards to an individual than a corporation, perhaps even rising to a
multiple of the insider's earnings for the previous year. Once again, the final figure
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Under such a scheme, recoveries would be fully compensatory up
to the limit on damages applicable to the particular case. Only when
the total damages rose above this limit would the new standard have
any effect; if damages exceeded the amount the defendants were re-
quired to pay, all plaintiffs' damages would have to be prorated to
keep the total damages recovered within the upper limit. If prora-
tion were necessary, class actions"'0 could be employed to insure that
all injured parties would share in the recovery, rather than allowing
relief to operate on a first-come, first-served basis with plaintiffs recov-
ering initially having their claims satisfied in full and subsequent plain-
tiffs receiving little or no recovery. In the alternative, some form of
interpleader could be utilized, 10 4 with the maximum amount recov-
erable placed in the hands of a court subject to division among all
successful plaintiffs. 1 5
A standard of this nature would preserve the in terrorem effect
of rule lOb-5 while eliminating the possibility of crushing liability. An
objection might be raised that rule 10b-5 has traditionally been viewed
as compensatory in nature and that a corporation or individual de-
fendant found guilty of fraud should be required to compensate plain-
tiffs without regard to the detriment resulting to the defendant. How-
ever, the current problems inherent in rule 10b-5 demonstrate that
compensation of plaintiffs should not be the sole consideration. 10
It would seem that a lOb-5 standard which could deter fraudulent
activity while at the same time reducing the possibility of crippling
the defendant would be more satisfactory than the present system, in
which compensation is allowed -to plaintiffs without regard to the de-
fendant's ability to pay. Further, the flaws inherent in the present
administration of rule 10b-5 will be exacerbated by the absence of the
Birnbaum limitation brought about by Eason.
In the final analysis, the decision whether the Birnbaum doctrine
should be replaced by a new limiting standard ought to be based on
should be set at a level high enough to deter insiders from engaging in fraudulent activ-
ity yet not so high as to prove ruinous.
103. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
104. See FED. R. CIv. P. 22.
105. The mechanics of proration of damages are similarly provided for in ALI
FEDERAL SEcuRIEs CODE, supra note 96, § 1409. For examples of arbitrary limita-
tions of damages in other areas of the law and the procedures used to distribute ratably
the damage awards, see Atomic Energy Act H8 170(e), (o), 42 U.S.C. H8 2210(e), (o)
(1970) (liability for nuclear accidents); FED. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Rule F (admir-
alty and maritime claims).
106. See notes 87-94 supra and accompanying text.
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an examination of the policies behind rule 10b-5. Ideally, such an
analysis should entail a fresh consideration of rule lOb-5 in light of
its present day status. The suggestions advanced by this Note are not
intended to be comprehensive, but rather are presented as illustrative
of the -type of analysis that should be employed. In Eason, the Sev-
enth Circuit took the significant and laudable step of becoming the
first circuit court to reject the Birnbaum doctrine. The decision is
disappointing, however, in that the court made no attempt to gauge
the effect that the elimination of the purchaser-seller requirement will
have on rule 10b-5 actions or to do more than trust to future litigation
to determine the appropriate limits to the rule.
The great expansion of rule 10b-5 has been caused by a history
of extremely liberal judicial interpretations of the rule. If this long-
standing judicial policy has created difficulties, the courts should be
willing to attempt to alleviate the problems, even if this should entail
innovative steps, such as the judicial creation of an arbitrary lim-
itation on damages. However, precedents for court-imposed limi-
tations on damages are few'0r and judicial caution will quite likely
result in no such judicial creation of an arbitrary limitation on dam-
ages.' 08 Further, although the SEC under its rulemaking power un-
doubtedly has the power to amend rule lOb-5 to include such a limi-
tation, 0 19 such action seems highly unlikely," 0 given the SEC's tradi-
tional advocacy of an expansive view of rule lOb-5 and the controversy
such a step would arouse. Therefore, if Eason is followed in other
circuits,"' and a new limitation on rule 10b-5 thus becomes an even
107. One commentator cites the judicially ordered change from contributory to com-
parative negligence in Georgia and the traditional rule of apportionment of damages
according to fault in admiralty cases as precedents for a judicial limitation on damages.
Comment, supra note 90, at 180. He concludes that "[w]hile there is little direct sup-
port for judicial apportionment of losses, there are no bars to such apportionment. If
cogent arguments can be advanced in support of limitation of damages through the ap-
portionment of losses, courts should respond to those arguments by adopting such a
scheme." Id. at 181.
108. The reluctance of the Supreme Court to move forcefully to bring order out of
,the current chaotic status of rule 10b-5 can be seen in the denial of certiorari in Eason.
See 42 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974). This was done despite the clear conflict
over the purchaser-seller requirement in the circuits. On the same day the Court de-
nied certiorari in Eason, it denied certiorari in a case which had upheld the Birnbaum
doctrine. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.
3593 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1974).
109. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
110. See Bradford, supra note 73, at 222; Marsh, supra note 94, at 75.
111. Since Eason was decided, the Fifth Circuit has stated that "we expressly reaf-
firm the vitality of the purchaser-seller requirement in this circuit." Sargent v. Ge-
nesco, Inc., 42 U.S.L.W. 2552, 2553 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 1974).
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more compelling need, it would seem likely that the creation of such
a limitation will be left to Congress, which could implement such a
limitation by amendment to the Exchange Act. Given the present
status of rule lOb-5, it is to be hoped that the courts, Congress and
the SEC will consider the need for a new doctrine limiting damages
under rule IOb-5.
